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1. Introduction
In recent years a new regionalism has begun to emerge in East Asia that represents a
clear break from the region’s strong history of multilateralism. The countries of East
Asia have been giving more attention to ways of expanding intra regional trade that
include: the establishment of regional trade agreements (RTAs) such as ASEAN+3;
plans to establish a free trade area involving the economies of ASEAN and China; as
well as moves towards bilateral trade agreements (BTAs). Such a development is
important given that an export led growth and development strategy provided the
platform for the region’s remarkable, and prolonged, period of high and sustained
economic growth dating back to the 1960s, and that lies at the core of the East Asian
Development Model (EADM). Export growth will remain a key ingredient for the
recovery of the region after the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. The trend
towards this new regionalism, the reasons for it, its impact upon the region, its future
evolution and prospects are, therefore, of profound regional, and indeed global,
significance
This paper focuses upon the meaning and implications of this new regionalism for the
“old” EADM, and explores the key ingredients of an emerging “new” EADM growth
and development paradigm, incorporating the new regionalism, that appears to be
emerging in the wake of the 1997-98 crisis. In doing so the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 summarises recent developments in regional trade agreements in East Asia,
and discusses the factors behind this new tide of regionalism. Section 3 discusses the
implications of the new regionalism in the context of the EADM past and present.
Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
2. Recent Development of RTAs in East Asia
2.1. Recent Developments
Until the Asian crisis erupted in 1997 the East Asian economies pursued a multilateral
approach to trade throughout the post-war period, unlike Western European countries
and the United States. In particular, Japan, China and South Korea were the world’s
only major economies that had yet to conclude a free trade area (FTA). The sole
exception was the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has been
planning an FTA for several years with a target date of 2002. However, a new
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regionalism is emerging in East Asia. A number of bilateral agreements have been
concluded and are being negotiated or studied. Japan signed an agreement in January
2002 with Singapore to create an FTA. Japan has also negotiated, studied, or considered
bilateral FTAs, with Korea, Chile, Mexico, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Switzerland, Taiwan, and Thailand. Korea is also negotiating with Chile, and studying
bilateral FTAs with New Zealand, Mexico, Thailand as well as Japan. Singapore and
New Zealand signed an agreement in November 2000 to form a Closer Economic
Partnership, based on a free trade area. Singapore is currently negotiating a bilateral
regional arrangement with Australia, and is laying the groundwork for similar
agreements with Canada, Mexico, India, and the United States. Hence, in the East Asian
region, Japan, Korea and Singapore are involved in negotiations with more than one
other country about the formation of bilateral agreements 1 . This trend towards
bilateralism is likely to spread to other East Asian countries.
Many-country agreements are also being negotiated or studied in East Asia. ASEAN
and the Closer Economic Relations (CER) countries discussed a link between the two
free trade areas in November 2000, even though the recommendation from a HighLevel Taskforce to proceed with negotiations was not adopted by the Meeting of the
ASEAN-CER Ministers. A North-East Asian Free Trade Area (NEAFTA) consisting of
China, Japan and Korea is also being studied. At the “ASEAN Plus Three” summit in
November 1999, Japan, Korea, and China agreed to launch a joint research project
involving institutes of the three countries to discuss the possibility of forming an FTA
among themselves in Northeast Asia. Since then the three countries have held a summit
every year at the ASEAN+3 meetings, and have held regular meetings of their finance
ministers.2

During the recent summit of the ASEAN+3 countries in November 2001, China and
ASEAN announced that they had decided to create an FTA within ten years. Only one
year ago, China had proposed an FTA with ASEAN at the summit with ASEAN
1

In the case of Singapore the adoption of this so called hub and spokes approach has led to a questioning
of whether such BTAs could undermine the AFTA process and RTAs in general. Mexico is another
example of a country that has also successfully adopted a hub and spokes approach to trade liberalisation.
2
Among the three, each country is one of the largest trading partners of the other two. For China, Japan
is its largest trading partner and Korea the third. For Japan, China (including Taiwan) ranks the second
and Korea the third. For Korea, Japan and China are the second and the third trading partners,
respectively.
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leaders. The Philippines has also proposed the East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA),
which is a grouping that covers the whole area of East Asia. At the ASEAN+3 summit
in November 2001 Korea also called for the formation of an East Asian economic
community, which is equivalent to the EAFTA.
The recent regionalism of East Asia is not altogether “new”, as Mahathir Mohamed, the
Prime Minister of Malaysia, proposed an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) a decade
ago. But the EAEG proposal was not pursued, largely because the United States
strongly objected and proposed member countries, Japan and Korea in particular, were
reluctant in the face of this objection. With little attention from the West, East Asia
created the “ASEAN+3” forum in 1997, with the same membership (the ten members of
the ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea) envisaged by Prime Minister Mahathir. Even
though it will take quite a while to launch an FTA and to form an East Asian economic
community, this trend in East Asia represents a clear break from a strong history of
multilateralism.
The new regionalism in East Asia has been proceeding more rapidly on financial issues
than on trade. For example, the Manila Framework was drawn up in November 1997,
aimed at achieving financial stability in the region through cooperation between the
East Asian countries. Fourteen countries from the Asia-Pacific region have participated
in the Framework, which involves working on many issues including intra-regional
financial cooperation, mutual cooperation to strengthen the financial architecture and
surveillance, and on cooperation to monitor intra-regional capital movements.
In May 2000 the member countries of ASEAN+3 announced the Chiang Mai Initiative,
and agreed to build a network of currency swap arrangements. A currency swap
agreement was signed at their annual summit meeting in Singapore in November 2000,
and there has been much discussion about creating an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) and
common currency baskets3. The idea of an AMF was proposed by Japan in September
1997. Japan expressed its willingness to contribute more than half of the funds
amounting to US$100 billion. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have also indicated
their intent to participate in the AMF. Korea and most other East Asian countries agreed
to the idea. Even China, which was against the idea at first, has changed its attitude4.
3

See for example Wang (2000), Kim, Ryou and Wang (2000), Ogawa (2001), and Lamberte, Milo and
Pontines (2001).
4
Nonetheless, the AMF has still not made any tangible progress, due to strong opposition by the United
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Hong Kong and the Philippines have proposed the creation of the Asian Currency Unit
(ACU). An Asian Bank for Reconstruction and Development and an Asian BIS (Bank
for International Settlement) have also been discussed.
During a summit of the ASEAN+3 in 1999, South Korea proposed the establishment of
an expert panel, the East Asia Vision Group, as the first step in exploring the possibility
of forging a regional cooperation mechanism. This group discussed ways to develop the
ASEAN+3 grouping into a regional cooperation forum. A joint surveillance of shortterm capital movements and an early warning system in East Asia have also been
studied. The group later proposed the establishment of an East Asian Monetary Fund
and a regional exchange rate coordination mechanism, with the long-term goal of
creating a common currency area. Other recommendations included upgrading the
annual ASEAN+3 meetings to an East Asian summit.
2.2. Factors behind the new regionalism
The important question is why the East Asian countries have changed their course of
direction toward pursuing preferential arrangements? There are three main factors
relating to the world economy that are relevant to this issue. The first factor is the slow
process of liberalisation under the WTO. Specifically, the failure of the WTO to begin a
new round of multilateral negotiations in Seattle in 1999, illustrated the difficulty of
pushing through comprehensive multilateral liberalisation. In addition countries such as
the US and those of the EU have stronger negotiating power than the developing
countries in the WTO and their agendas can be quite different. Accordingly,
negotiations within the WTO have, increasingly, seen a movement of agendas towards
issues other than tariffs, such as the environment, intellectual property rights, labour
standards and competition policy, which are of more interest to the U.S. and the EU but
of less interest to the East Asian countries.
The second factor is the enlargements of the EU and growing Pan-American moves to
increase free trade arrangements, such as expanding the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) into the proposed Free Trade Areas of the Americas (FTAA) that

States.
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includes the entire American continent except Cuba. Thus the EU process of economic
integration has resulted in the proliferation of RTAs in the rest of the world.5
The third factor is the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, which demonstrated the
risk of contagion and investors’ perception of the region as a “single market”. This
factor may have operated as a trigger, which explains the timing of the recent movement
towards regionalism in East Asia, given the underlying changes outlined in the first two
factors. Moreover, approaches to the crisis by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
backed by the U.S., have been criticised. Thus, “no longer trusting the U.S. or the
international institutions for protection, Asian leaders are searching for home-grown
defences against the wild swings in global money markets” Feinberg (2000). This is
why the new regionalism in East Asia has been proceeding more rapidly on the
financial side than on trade, unlike the case of the EU and other RTA predecessors. The
impotence of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and ASEAN in
the wake of the financial crisis added to the grievance of the crisis-hit East Asian
countries. 6
3.

The East Asian Development Model: Past and present

3.1.

Ingredients of the old EADM

Until the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98 East Asia had achieved a remarkable
record of high and sustained economic growth. In particular, Japan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand had been the highperforming East Asian economies (HPAEs). This remarkable achievement was once
considered by a number of observers, including the World Bank, as “the East Asian
miracle”. 7 The East Asian economies were hailed as models of achievement for other
emerging economies to emulate.
Before discussing how the recent trend of regionalism in East Asia relates with the
region’s development model, we start with a summary of the main elements of the
EADM. There have been numerous attempts to explain the so-called “miracle”
performance of the rapidly developing economies of East Asia. Table 1 summarises the
5

For a discussion of this trend, see WTO (1999, 2000b).
Lloyd and Lee (2001) discuss how recent developments in regionalism in East Asia relate with APEC.
7
World Bank (1993)
6

6

Table 1. The “old” East Asian Development Model – key ingredients
Initial Conditions:
. Backward economies
. Sound work ethic and low labour costs
. High sprit of education and good primary education system
External Environment:
. Trade liberalisation under the GATT
. Free trade approach by the U.S.
. Flying geese pattern pioneered by Japan
. Global capital flow/international capital markets
Policy Factors:
. Primarily market based mechanisms of competitive discipline
. Tailored government intervention
. Outward orientation
. Stable macroeconomic management
. Emphasis on education
Interim Outcome:
. High savings
. High investment
. Increasing human capital
. Rapid growth of exports
. Rapid catching-up of technology
. Rapid demographic change
Final Outcome:
. Rapid industrialisation
. Rapid and sustained economic growth
. Reduced poverty
. Improving social indicators
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major determinants of the East Asian performance. As seen in the table we attempt to
divide the framework into initial conditions, external environment, policy factors, and
interim and final outcomes.
Initial Conditions
First, in many East Asian countries rapid development took place from an initial
position of “economic backwardness”, characterised by a low level of national income
and income per capita. The historical record strongly suggests that really rapid growth
of real income per capita is confined to cases where countries, that initially lag behind
the leaders in terms of income and productivity levels, go through a phase of rapid
catching up (Crafts, 1998). But catching-up is not automatic. In his famous discussion
of the opportunities and difficulties of “economic backwardness,” Gerschenkron (1962)
suggested that economically backward countries could achieve a take-off into very rapid
growth only if they take radical measures to promote development through institutional
innovations and controlled capital markets. With the exception of Hong Kong, the
development strategies of most of the East Asian countries to achieve rapid catch-up
growth bear strong resemblance to Gerschenkron’s recipe (Crafts, 1998).
Economic backwardness has another dimension, not central to Gerschenkron’s account.
“As economies develop, they typically undergo a demographic transition in which birth
and death rates both fall to a much lower level but during which there is an acceleration
of population which tends initially to reduce and then significantly to increase the
proportion of working age” (Crafts, 1998: p.11). Crafts asserted that the working age
group rose rapidly in many cases between the early 1970s and the early 1990s. Bloom
and Williamson (1997), suggested that this change in age structure may have offered a
substantial growth bonus in East Asia, of the order of 1.5 to 1.9 percent per year.
Second, the sound work ethic of Asian people was another asset. Asian people were
diligent as proven by their long working hours and high savings rates. Such diligence in
combination with low costs of labour employment made these economies attractive to
foreign investors. A high pool of available savings provided the necessary funds for
high rates of domestic investment (see Table 2). A number of factors have been
advanced to explain the high level of domestic saving in the economies of East Asia
(see, for example, World Bank (1993)). First, the rapid economic growth experienced
by these countries. Studies suggest that savings are an outcome of high growth (see for
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example Carroll, Weil and Summers (1993)) although this does vary by country.
Second, the rapid demographic transitions experienced by these countries. The size, age
distribution, and ratio of working to non-working population can exert an influence on
aggregate saving (see for example Ando and Modigliani (1963) and Modigliani (1970)).
Third, sound policy fundamentals. Low fiscal budget deficits, and surpluses, focusing
upon restraining government spending, enabled public savings to complement private
savings including that from the private corporate sector. Fourth, specific policy
measures to encourage saving were adopted including: the establishment of financial
systems (for example postal savings institutions); effective protection of deposits at
financial institutions; tax incentives; restrictions on consumer credit and spending; and
forced savings through mandatory pension schemes (important in both Singapore and
Malaysia).
Table 2

China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
South Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan
Thailand
Vietnam

East Asian Economies – Gross Domestic Savings (percent of GDP)
1980

1990

2000

2002

34.1
34.5
29.2
23.8
32.9
26.6
38.8
32.6
23.0
-

38.7
35.4
32.3
37.2
34.4
18.7
43.4
28.1
34.3
2.9

38.0
32.2
22.0
30.9
46.9
17.0
49.8
24.8
30.0
25.0

38.5
30.0
21.3
30.0
46.1
15.5
52.0
26.6
33.1
24.1

Sources: Asian Development Bank, 2001, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries,
Table 15, p.52, Vol. 32 (years 1980 and 1990).
Asian Development Bank, 2001, Asian Development Outlook, Statistical Appendix, Table A7, p.214
(years 2000 and 2002).

Third, in most East Asian countries people were well educated due to the strong
Confucian emphasis on education, focusing upon the development of a good primary
education system. As can be observed from Table 3 East Asia compared reasonably
well with other regions of the global economy during the period of the 1960s in terms of
primary enrolment. This performance, however, was outstanding during the period of
the 1980s and 1990s, even outperforming that of the high-income economies. In terms
of secondary school enrolments, this compared well with other comparable regions. In
fact, Rodrik (1994) showed that countries that were poorer, but that had good primary
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education systems and less inequality of income and land distribution around 1960,
grew faster than the others during subsequent periods.
Table 3 Education: percentage of age group enrolled in education
Primary
East Asia and
the Pacific
High income
South Asia
Sub-Saharan
Africa
Europe
Arab countries
Latin American
and Caribbean

Secondary

Tertiary

1965
88

1980
111

1995
115

1965
-

1980
43

1995
65

1965
1

1980
3

1995
6

104
68
41

102
76
78

103
99
75

61
24
4

87
27
14

104
49
27

21
4

35
5
1

57
6
-

61
99

87
106

97
111

17
20

42
42

64
53

3
4

11
14

15
15

Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1992; World Bank, World Development Indicators,
1998.

External Environment
East Asia’s fast growth occurred in favourable international circumstances, at least until
the late 1980s. First, the international movement towards freer trade under the GATT
enabled East Asian countries to effectively pursue an export-oriented growth strategy.
Following a number of multilateral trade talks under the auspices of the GATT, the
developed countries moved toward the opening of their domestic markets, yet most East
Asian countries, as developing countries, were allowed to keep their domestic markets
effectively closed until the end of the 1980s.
Second, the free trade approach on the part of the U.S, which provided the largest
market for East Asia’s exports, assisted the export-oriented industrialisation strategy of
these countries. Also, most East Asian countries received a considerable amount of
explicit and implicit economic assistance from the United States during the cold war
era, and this provided seed money at the initial stage of economic development.
Third, like flocks of geese flying in a “V” formation to make their flying easier, the East
Asian countries followed the export oriented development model of Japan – the lead
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goose. Japan successfully developed globally competitive high-technology products that
it was able to export successfully, including to the economies of East Asia, while its
domestic market remained almost effectively closed to foreign competition. After the
Plaza Accord in 1985, however, the yen began to increase in value relative to the US
dollar. The strong yen encouraged many Japanese companies, particularly in the
automotive and electronics industries, to establish overseas plants in order to maintain
their international competitiveness (Sato and Rizzo (1986)). The stronger yen also
increased the cost of employing labour, relative to that of its regional competitors such
as Korea, and resulted in many of Japan’s labour intensive industries moving offshore
to production units in the lower labour cost countries of East Asia8. Instead of Japan
exporting these products to East Asia, these countries now started to export to Japan. In
the process Japan, through its foreign direct investment (FDI), had passed on its
production technologies to the East Asian nations. Specifically Korea and Taiwan
followed Japan with a certain time lag, and later, as their labour costs increased, the
economies of Southeast Asia followed during the period of the 1980s, and increasingly
so into the 1990s as they adopted a more export oriented policy and increasingly opened
their financial sectors to further inflows of short and long term capital flows.
Fourth, it is also important to bear in mind that the economies of East Asia, particularly
from the period after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement, began to benefit
from the rapid development of international financial markets and the globalisation of
capital flows. This assisted in the accumulation of FDI and the expansion of regional
growth of output and exports. However, such flows of capital increased dramatically,
enabling these economies to sustain very high rates of investment, but also contributed
to problems on current account and in the accumulation of foreign debt.
Policy Factors
First, the economies of East Asia operated within an environment of primarily market
based mechanisms of competitive discipline. This contributed to the development of
competitive enterprises subject to hard budget constraints, and, by limiting price
distortions, the system contributed to a more efficient and productive allocation of
scarce resources.

8

Resulting in the so-called hollowing out of Japan’s manufacturing industries.
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Second, with the exception of Hong Kong, there was a strong leadership role by
regional governments in creating and developing the “market”, and their credible
commitment to its long-run development. This is a somewhat controversial argument, as
there is plenty of evidence that East Asia’s industrial policies did not contribute to the
growth of industries’ productivity. 9 But at least until the early 1980s a strong
government leadership was rather necessary and desirable, because the domestic
markets were incomplete or missing and the structure of domestic industry was rather
simple. Even if the net benefits of government intervention policies are still
controversial, they clearly allowed some Asian firms to establish themselves in
industries, such as steel, chemical engineering, shipbuilding, electronics and
automobiles, where the costs of entry were high.
Third, an outward-looking development strategy, particularly a dynamic export sector,
has been a crucial ingredient of the miracle (FRBSF, 1997). The East Asian economies
started from a very low level of national income and income per capita. Consequently,
domestic producers faced a very limited domestic market, suggesting that developing an
industrial base through import substitution had severe limitations. The only way
forward was an export oriented industrialisation growth and development policy,
requiring the development of globally competitive enterprises. Most East Asian
governments set firm- and industry-specific export targets and developed exportmarketing institutions. They also made selective use of tariff protection, export
incentives ranging from moral suasion to subsidies, and provided industry with
financing at lower cost.
The outward-oriented development forced domestic firms to become more efficient and
absorb foreign technology and managerial know-how in order to compete in world
markets. It also promoted growth by providing access to larger markets and generating
increasing returns to scale in production. The export-oriented development was a means
of achieving viable external balances, generating foreign exchange to purchase essential
technology and imported inputs, and generating the demand needed to accelerate GDP
growth.
Fourth was the adherence to stable macroeconomic management. This contributed to
vigorous accumulation through higher rates of investment and to improved allocation by
9

For instance, Beason and Weinstein (1996) find that industrial policies in Japan were not directed
towards the higher-growth industries, and Lee (1996) finds a similar result for Korea.
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reducing inflation and instability in relative prices (World Bank, 1993). The
maintenance of competitive exchange rates was also seen as being important. During
the period of the 1990s, however, and before the financial crisis of 1997, the East Asian
economies adopted varying nominal exchange rate policies vis a vis the US dollar.
Some countries pursued relatively fixed rates while others pursued more flexible
exchange rates.
While developments in nominal exchange rates over the period 1990-97 suggested, in
general, improved competitiveness for these economies, developments in their real
exchange rates suggested otherwise. With the exception of Korea and Taiwan the East
Asian economies by the end of 1996 experienced a considerable appreciation of their
real exchange rates and loss of international competitiveness. The countries with the
more rigid exchange rate policy rules experienced a larger real exchange rate
appreciation (see Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998), p.20).
Fifth, education policies that focused on primary and secondary schools generated rapid
increases in labour force skills and enhanced the productivity and employability of the
workforce. Governments in these countries successfully addressed the market failures of
missing information and positive externalities in the educational field, by focusing
education spending on universal primary and secondary education. The share of
expenditure allocated to tertiary education tended to be low, and this was more focused
upon the acquisition of technical skills, vocational training and technically sophisticated
disciplines. Consequently, in the context of the New Economy, with its emphasis on
technology and knowledge intensive industries, this latter situation is likely to present a
major future problem for the region.
Advocates of free markets saw the triumph of the East Asian economies as being in
their small governments, the market mechanism and unfettered private initiative. On the
other hand interventionists saw the East Asian miracle as being the triumph of selective
interventionist policies by East Asian governments. Trade economists viewed it as a
miracle based on outward orientation, labour economists stressed the early emphasis on
education, and macroeconomists pointed to the region’s fiscal conservatism (Rodrik,
1999). But the truth is in between: to varying degrees, all of these policy factors
contributed to the fast growth performance of East Asia.
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Interim Outcome
The EADM produced impressive results by any standard. These included: high levels of
domestic financial savings and private domestic investment; rapidly growing human
capital; rapid growth of exports; and rapid catching-up of foreign technologies. These
we describe here as being major interim outcomes which became the principal engines
of growth. For example, the World Bank (1993) report asserts that investment,
exceeding 20 percent of GDP on average between 1960 and 1990, combined with rising
endowments of human capital “account” for roughly two-thirds of the growth in the
HPAEs.
The HPAE governments encouraged private investment with a wide array of
mechanisms such as low capital goods prices, subsidised interest rates for corporate
investment, and limited risk for private investors (World Bank 1993). A stable business
environment with relatively low inflation also encouraged investment in long gestation
fixed assets. High rates of investment were financed by domestic saving, as well as
through increasing flows of FDI. High human capital, rapid growth of exports, and
rapid technological change further laid the foundations of rapid growth and
development. Rapid demographic change was also a key characteristic outcome from
this rapid development.
Final Outcome
The interim outcomes contributed to rapid industrialisation, rapid and sustained
economic growth, and considerably improved social indicators. Poverty declined
significantly and other social indicators, such as equality of income, life expectancy and
fertility rates, compared favourably with other countries at a similar level of income
before and during the period of rapid growth. Table 4 indicates, for example, that the
East Asian economies compared favourably with the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa,
the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of income
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Table 4

Social indicators – an international regional comparison

Infant mortality rate
per 1000 live births

Life expectancy

East Asia
and
Pacific
High
income
countries
South Asia
Sub
Saharan
Africa
Eastern
Europe
and CIS
Arab
States
Latin
America
and the
Caribbean

Income inequality average Gini
coefficient

Total fertility rate,
births per woman

197075

1980

1990

1996

19952000

1965

1970

1980

1990

1999

1980s

1990s

1965

1970-75

1980

1990

19952000

60.4

65

68

68

68.8

95

87

56

34

34

38.7

38.1

6.2

5.0

3.1

2.7

2.1

72.0

74

77

77

77.8

24

21

13

8

6

33.2

33.8

2.8

2.1

1.9

1.7

1.7

49.9
45.3

54
48

58
51

62
52

61.9
48.8

147
157

128
138

120
115

93
107

69
107

35.0
43.7

31.9
47.0

6.3
6.6

5.6
6.8

5.3
6.6

4.2
6.5

3.6
5.8

69.2

-

-

-

68.4

-

37

-

-

25

25.0

28.9

-

2.5

-

-

1.5

51.9

59

61

67

65.9

151

129

96

79

44

40.5

38.0

7.1

6.5

6.1

5.7

4.1

60.8

65

68

70

69.3

94

87

59

48

32

49.8

49.3

5.8

5.1

4.1

3.3

2.7

Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001,
World Bank, World Development Reports (various),
World Bank, World Development Indicators (various),
Deininger and Squire (1996),

inequality throughout the period of the 1980s and 1990s, although lagged behind the
performance of the economies of South Asia. The gini coefficient, however, improved
only slightly in East Asia during the period of the 1990s in comparison to that of the
1980s. East Asia compared very favourably against economies in South Asia, SubSaharan Africa, the Middle Eastern economies, and Latin America in terms of life
expectancy, infant mortality, and particularly well in terms of fertility rates throughout
its period of rapid economic development and growth.
East Asia’s performance in regard to poverty alleviation has also been truly remarkable.
Poverty has declined not only in breadth (the number of poor) but also in depth (severity
of poverty). The period of rapid economic growth was transmitted into improvements in
welfare by generating employment growth and an expansion in productivity (World
Bank (1993), p.2). Over a period of some 20 years the region reduced the number of
people living in poverty by half. As indicated by Figure 1, people living below the
international poverty line of US$1 a day fell from 720 million in the mid 1970s to 350
million in the mid 1990s. The rate of decline over the period 1985-95 was 34 percent
while it was 27 percent over the period 1975-85. This pace of poverty reduction was
faster than for any other region in the world, resulting in a decline of the share of the
world’s poor living in East Asia:
“Six out of ten East Asians lived in absolute poverty in 1975, roughly two in ten did in
1995” (World Bank, 1998, p.2)
3.2. Towards a New East Asian Development Model
The events of 1997-98 induced academics, policy makers, and journalists alike to reevaluate the EADM, and to identify whether this required a fundamentally different
economic growth paradigm, or model, or whether the old model was still applicable but
just required some fine-tuning. Different views on the EADM model stemmed from
different explanations for the causes of the crisis. While a number of explanations have
been offered for East Asia’s financial crisis, they can be broadly divided into three
groups. The first group argues that the Asian crisis erupted because, even though there
was no serious problem, self-fulfilling investors suddenly panicked and ran away in a
herd from the region (Radelet and Sachs, 1998). The second group takes the opposite
position and claims that the fundamental problems of these countries had accumulated
and finally erupted at once when they reached breaking point (Krugman, 1998; Corsetti,

Pesenti and Roubini, 1998). A third group argued that the crisis erupted mainly because
of external factors like abrupt changes in international market conditions. Unlike the
first and second groups, which included mostly economists, the third group seemed to
include mostly politicians and journalists. Some people even claimed that the Asian
financial crisis was the result of hegemonic conflict between the East and the West.
Figure 1

Poverty development in East Asia
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Blaming only one factor for the crisis, however, does not seem to be appealing. For
example, attributing it exclusively to irrational (or rational) speculative attacks and
contagion does not seem to make sense, because the contagion varied widely across the
East Asian countries. Blaming it solely on an economic system once praised as a
successful model for development is also inconsistent. It seems that there is some truth
in each of these explanations. In other words, the East Asian financial crisis occurred
not due to one single reason, but due to elements from all of the three explanatory
categories.10

10

Using the ‘stroke’ hypothesis, Harvie and H. H. Lee (2002) synthesise most of the appealing

explanations and theories of the financial crisis, and show how the numerous factors were coherently
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If this is true, the old EADM, which was adequate throughout most of the period of high
growth until the early 1990s, will need to be overhauled in order to give the region a
new dynamism and enable it to return to its earlier strong growth path. Even if the main
cause of the recent crisis was largely due to volatile international financial markets, the
crisis exposed several structural problems that need to be overcome if East Asia is to
revive its sustained rapid growth. In any case, the Asian crisis has irrevocably altered
the economic landscape of the region.
We construct a new development model, the core ingredients of which are summarised
in Table 5. As in Table 1 we begin with reviewing the initial conditions and external
international environment, and attempt to suggest plausible policy factors and desired,
or targeted, outcomes.
Initial Conditions
It is worth noting that most East Asian economies can no longer be described as less
developed, but more accurately as maturing economies. However, there may still remain
a good deal of scope for rapid catch-up growth before diminishing returns to heavy
capital accumulation bite severely (Crafts, 1998). But the growth bonus due to change
in age structure in East Asia, which was inherently temporary, may now be over. This
implies that the fast growth rates the East Asian economies enjoyed before are no longer
attainable. The region still possesses a sound work ethic amongst its people, which still
remains as a valuable asset. But as these economies mature further, their workers will
increasingly expect to be compensated in terms of higher wages and by improved social
safety net coverage. Hence their traditional advantage in labour intensive production
will be steadily eroded.
A high sprit of education also remains valid, but as these countries develop into
advanced economies, and with the technology and skill intensive demands of the “new
economy”, they will increasingly require a highly skilled and creative labour force. But
deficiencies in the current education system in most East Asian countries means an
inadequate provision for these economies of the kind of labour force they need most.

intertwined in causing the financial crisis in Korea in 1997. The same approach could be applied to the
crisis elsewhere in East Asia.
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Table 5. New Paradigm of the East Asian Development Model
Initial Conditions:
. Maturing economies
. Sound work ethic
. High sprit of education, and good primary and intermediary education system
External Environment:
. WTO, trade and investment liberalisation (Globalisation)
. Proliferation of global regionalism
. Intensification of domestic and foreign market competition (including China, and Indo-China)
. Fair trade approach by the U.S.
. No more flying geese pattern, due to Japan’s loss of economic momentum
. Rapid growth of international financial markets
. Worldwide knowledge revolution
Policy Factors:
. Primarily market based mechanisms of competitive discipline
. Improved Governance (corporate, banking and public sectors)
. Encouragement of small and medium enterprises
. Trade and domestic economy orientation (balanced growth)
. Stable macroeconomic management
. Emphasis on high quality education
. Stronger cooperation within the region in both trade and finance
“Targeted” Interim Outcome:
. High savings
. High investment with prudence
. Increasing human capital
. Rapid growth of trade (intra-regional in particular)
. Rapid catching-up and pioneering technology in some areas
“Targeted” Final Outcome:
. Rapid growth of the “new” economy (technology and skill intensive industries), and in the
service sector
. Rapid and sustained economic growth
. Reduced poverty
. Improving social indicators
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External Environment
The global economic environment continues to change at a rapid pace, and those
economies best able to adapt to these changes will be the big winners in the new
millennium. First, with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the establishment of
the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the East Asian economies will face a more rapid
opening of their domestic markets to both trade and investment flows. Many of these
countries, such as Korea, are no longer considered to be developing economies by the
WTO, and hence cannot expect to be able to have access to global markets without at
the same time opening their own markets to foreign competition.
Second, unlike in the earlier period of rapid growth, the economies of East Asia are now
facing a proliferation of regionalism in both Europe and in the Americas, making the
task of further expanding exports to these key markets increasingly difficult. Hence
maintaining an export growth momentum in these markets appears to be increasingly
unlikely.
Third, within East Asia itself the next wave of rapidly developing economies is coming
through. In particular China, the economies of Indo-China, and, more specifically,
Vietnam. This will further intensify competition in both regional and global markets.
China’s recent accession to the WTO will represent a major threat to other regional
economies that compete in labour intensive and low value added products.
Fourth, the US market, the single biggest market for East Asian products, that
previously emphasised a free trade approach, has changed its attitude toward a fair trade
approach. Export-oriented industrial development has increasingly been constrained by
protectionist policies in the U.S. and other industrial countries.
Fifth, the foundation of the flying geese process, whereby countries at different levels of
industrialisation and development move together on the basis of a progressive
upgrading of their industries, has recently been shaken by the economic difficulties
faced by Japan. For instance, Japan, which had invested nearly US$50 billion in
developing East Asia from the mid 1980s onward, lost its bearings in the early 1990s.
Japan’s foreign direct investment, which totalled 35.3 trillion yen at the end of 1997,
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dropped to 31.2 trillion yen at the end of 1998 and to 25.5 trillion yen at the end of
1999. No new lead goose has come forward to replace Japan. China, perhaps, can
assume the lead role in the future. But thus far, competing across the
technology/production value chain with other countries in East Asia, China has broken
the flying geese pattern. Thereby posing a serious threat to the existing EADM.
Sixth, there has been a phenomenal growth of international financial markets and a
rapid opening of domestic financial markets in East Asia during the period of the 1990s.
The crisis of 1997-98 was triggered by a rapid withdrawal of short-term capital from the
crisis-afflicted economies. The rapid growth of short-term capital flows has the
potential to result in greater financial market volatility and indeed, as seen in East Asia,
to wreak havoc if there is a rapid reversal of such flows.
Finally, the world is today experiencing a knowledge revolution. In other words the
world is currently experiencing a major transition from an industrial society to a new
economic paradigm, where information and knowledge are the principal drivers of
competitiveness. The driving force behind this has been rapid advances in information
and communications technology (ICT). Rapid advances in ICT have brought
fundamental changes to the economic transaction modes of business, government, and
lifestyles. Indeed, the access to ICT-related tools and skills are becoming crucial
components in economic development worldwide.
Policy Factors
Given the changed economic circumstances in the wake of the financial crisis as well as
developments in the external environment previously identified, a re-appraisal of the
conduct of certain aspects of policy becomes essential. First, the primarily market based
mechanisms of competitive discipline will remain and intensify. It is no longer possible
to protect certain sectors of the economy behind trade and non-trade barriers.
Consequently, the development of domestic enterprises capable of competing
domestically and internationally will be essential. Second, East Asian governments need
to play a new role in the economy that focuses upon establishing the necessary
institutional framework that supports competitive and open markets, and contributes
towards capacity building. Key to this will be policy that focuses upon good governance
both in the private and public sectors. In the private sector the development of stock
markets and financial institutions with the capacity to monitor the performance of
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private sector enterprises will be essential to ensure a more efficient and productive
usage of financial resources.
Third, more policy emphasis also needs to be devoted to the development of small and
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In the wake of the crisis a re-appraisal of the role of
SMEs has taken place. The Korean and Taiwanese experience is of relevance here.
Korea has traditionally emphasised the role and importance of large enterprises, the
chaebol, and suffered severely during the period of the crisis, while Taiwan, dominated
by SMEs, came through the crisis relatively unscathed (see for example Harvie and B.
C. Lee (2002)). The development of the SME sector has the potential to expand growth,
employment, exports, reduce poverty, enhance regional development, empower groups
such as women, and contribute to a more crisis resilient economy. The issue of whether
industry policy should give more focus to the development of large or small enterprises
remains a contentious issue in the literature, see for example Hallberg (2000), however
the contribution of SMEs to the future development of the region remains of paramount
importance and particularly so for the developing economies.
Fourth, the East Asian governments should continue to pursue an outward-looking
development strategy as the relationship between openness and growth appears to be
fairly robust. But in the new framework, trade should be promoted not only by
promoting exports but also imports. This is not just because of the increasing pressure
from the industrialising countries elsewhere in the world. Rather this is because by
embodying technologies of the country of origin, and other countries contributing to the
product, imports are an effective vehicle for assimilating new technology (Bayoumi,
Coe, and Helpman, 1996). In addition, higher priority should be given to greater
integration between the domestic and external sectors of the economy, as well as giving
more emphasis to the development of sectors that serve primarily the domestic market.
The former, in particular, implies the need to increasingly incorporate domestic
enterprises in the supply chain of multinational enterprises located domestically but also
those located overseas. Hence an important change of emphasis would be to move
towards a more balanced approach to growth of the economy, in which domestic and
foreign market oriented enterprises are given more equal treatment.
Fifth, stable macroeconomic management should continue to be maintained. In the
wake of the crisis in 1997-98, many crisis-hit East Asian countries built up a
considerable amount of government debt to finance the restructuring of their financial
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institutions and corporations. Therefore special efforts to maintain stable
macroeconomic policies are required which will entail: the maintenance of low budget
deficits, or surpluses, and the reduction of public debt to a sustainable level; monetary
policy aimed at price stability; ensuring that the real exchange rate remains competitive;
ensure a reduction of foreign debt, particularly short term debt; and encourage the rapid
repayment of any international loans arising from assistance given during then period of
the financial and economic crisis of 1997-98. This, in collaboration with reform of the
financial and corporate sectors, will be essential for the establishment of a platform for
the long-term sustainable recovery of regional economies
Sixth, the East Asian countries will need to improve their current education systems so
as to provide the economy with a high skilled and creative labour force, which is in
most need, as the economies advance to the stage of being developed economies. In
addition, as noted previously, the world is moving toward the stage where knowledge
and information are key to economic growth. But the current education system in most
economies – except perhaps Hong Kong and Singapore – has not provided adequately
these economies with the kind of labour force that is increasingly required. Therefore
developing an appropriate education system to produce a creative, skilled and adaptable
workforce will be fundamental for the East Asian countries to embrace the new
economy for the 21st century.
Finally, stronger cooperation within the region in both trade and finance is desperately
needed. More detailed discussion of this is conducted in the following section, as the
theme of this paper is the relationship between East Asia’s regionalism and the region’s
development model.
“Targeted” Interim and final outcomes
As with the original EADM it is essential that the fundamentals for achieving high and
sustainable growth are put in place. Targeted interim outcomes must aim at the
maintenance of high rates of domestic saving to reduce the reliance on foreign funds,
foreign borrowing in particular, as much as possible. A second objective, and a key
lesson from the crisis, is the need for such funds to be put to productive usage with
prudence. Excessive investment in non-productive assets, such as real estate and
property development, resulted in excessive borrowing for this purpose both from
domestic and external sources. Third, attaining a high level of human capital to meet the
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demands of the new economy for a technologically literate and skilled workforce.
Fourth, maintaining export growth while ensuring the development of domestic market
opportunities. The expansion of export growth is likely to increasingly focus upon intra
regional trade, as discussed in the following section. Finally, in order to maintain its
international competitiveness, it will be essential for the region to continue the process
of technological catch-up in key sectors, as well as to engage in pioneering technology
development of its own.
If these key building blocks can be put in place then the region, in this new global
environment of intensive competition, improved information and communications
technology, and openness of markets, can flourish. It can be at the forefront of the rapid
growth of the new economy as well as of the service sector, return to relatively high and
sustainable growth rates, achieve further major progress in alleviating poverty, despite
the set backs arising from the recent crisis, and once again be at the forefront of
developing economies in terms of their improving social indicators.
3.3. East Asian Regionalism and the East Asian Development Model
As discussed in Section 2, there has been an increasing trend towards regionalism in
East Asia. The driving forces behind this have been: the slowing liberalisation process
under the WTO; proliferation of regionalism else where in the world; and the 1997-98
financial crisis which demonstrated the risk of contagion and investors perception of the
region as a “single market.”
If the world is a free market as a whole at the multilateral level, or keeps moving toward
it, the policies of free trade on the part of East Asian countries may be superior to one
that relies on regionalism. However, more efforts to build regional cooperative
frameworks within East Asia can be justified with the current worldwide trend of
regionalism. This suggests that the East Asian countries should pursue an outwardlooking development strategy that relies on both worldwide globalisation and the Asianwide “regionalisation” by forming FTAs among themselves. The implications of this for
the EADM is now briefly discussed.
First, it is clear that exports will remain important if the economies of East Asia are
going to return to high and sustainable growth. However with the growth of regional
trading blocs (for example NAFTA and the EU) access by the East Asian economies to
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these is likely to be fraught with increasing uncertainty. Instead, East Asia should give
more weight to expanding trade within the region itself. There is likely, therefore, to be
increased importance placed upon an intra regional trade emphasis rather than, as in the
past, an inter-regional trade emphasis 11 . Given the current WTO difficulties in
producing another round of tariff reductions, the East Asian economies can initiate this
process through greater economic integration between themselves, over which they
have more control, and where they have a vested interest in making it succeed. This is
particularly relevant given the complementarity of many of the regional economies.
Second, with greater regional integration comes the prospect of expanded competition
in domestic markets. Hence there is the need to develop globally competitive
indigenous enterprises that can compete both in domestic and international markets.
This would eventually help increase the productivity of East Asian countries and help
revitalise their economies. Enhancing corporate sector restructuring and transparency is
of particular importance here as is the expanded role of the SME sector.
Third, to benefit from further expansion in trade and investment in the region will
require stable financial markets, including that of regional currencies. The example of
the EU is of interest here. Perhaps the ultimate movement towards economic and
monetary union should be attempted in stages: movement towards free trade and a
single market; closer coordination of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies;
convergence criteria; movement towards fixed exchange rates, and movement towards a
single currency and a single central bank for East Asia (see for example Oh and Harvie
(2001)).

Fourth, while export growth will remain important, more emphasis should also be given
to the development of the domestic sector and the growth opportunities this provides.
Hence there should be more emphasis on balanced growth for the economies of East
Asia. This should include a greater focus upon building relationships between the
domestic sector and the external sector. In the past these were highly segregated in
many countries.
Finally, in addition to these economic gains, the East Asian countries would be able to
make the overall ties among themselves stronger and more stable through increased

11

About 50 percent of trade for the East Asian economies is already accounted for by trade with other
East Asian economies
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interdependence, and thereby increase their influence in the international trade and
investment arena. Increasing the likelihood that issues of prime concern to these
countries can be more directly addressed in international forums. Most East Asian
countries also seem to agree that they need not only intra-trade liberalisation, but also
intra-regional cooperation in the political, security, social and culture arenas to create a
regional community.
While regionalism in East Asia is still at an early stage and its precise shape still
remains vague, in the foreseeable future, however, the ASEAN+3 might be converted to
a sort of East Asian Community and a full-fledged East Asia free trade area. If formed,
this entity would immediately rank alongside the EU and NAFTA in size, transforming
the world into a tripolar economy (Bergsten, 2000). The creation of such an East Asian
economic bloc could have many implications for the global system. On the positive
side, East Asian economic integration could be a catalyst for the global trading system
in the same way as the successive process of economic integration has been during the
post-war period. Thus, a unified East Asia could accelerate the momentum of overall
trade liberalisation, boost global economic growth, and contribute to international
peace. On the negative side, a process of new regionalism in East Asia would
discriminate against outsiders. This in turn could act as a disruptive force in the world
trading system, and undermine the multilateralism of the WTO.
The overall outcome will be determined mostly by the policies of the East Asian
countries themselves. The East Asian countries, however, should not reject the
multilateral institutions. That is, they should continue to work with, and within, the
framework of the WTO and cooperate with the rest of the world in both economic and
security terms. But, as with the case of the EU, East Asia should raise its voice in the
global world and attempt to seek its own “made-in Asia” solutions and independent
actions in certain cases.
4. Concluding Remarks
This paper has reviewed recent developments in regionalism in East Asia, and discussed
how this relates to the region’s old economic development paradigm, and how it fits into
the new growth and development paradigm. As in the past the growth of exports will
remain a key ingredient behind the recovery of the region in the aftermath of the events
of 1997-98, but more emphasis will be placed upon the growth of intra regional trade
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rather than inter regional trade. Movement towards closer economic integration for the
regional economies has the potential to produce substantial trade and finance benefits.
In particular the establishment of an expanded regional trade bloc, such as ASEAN+3,
should be actively encouraged, as well as the movement towards an Asian Currency
Union.
The original EADM model has now run its course, but in the process has produced
remarkable social and economic outcomes. Many of the economies of East Asia have
now matured and face a different global trade and financial environment, with the need
to develop their “new economies” based upon technology and knowledge intensive
sectors. A more balanced approach to economic development, emphasising the
development of both the domestic and external sectors, will also be required, as will the
need to put in place the necessary restructuring of their financial and corporate sectors
to overcome the problems that lay at the heart of the events of 1997-98. The need to
develop a globally competitive enterprise sector, giving more focus to the development
of the SME sector, will be crucial. Those economies most able to adapt to rapidly
changing regional and global conditions will be the new East Asian miracle economies
of the twenty first century.
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